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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Bryan Taylor, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
The Public Service Commission ] 
of Utah and PacifiCorp, ] 
Respondents. ] 
i Brief of Respondent 
) Case No. 20030694-CA 
Pursuant to Rules 24, 26, and 27 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, respondents Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") 
and PacifiCorp hereby respectfully submit their response to the brief filed by 
petitioner Bryan Taylor ("Taylor") in the above-captioned matter. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders of the Commission 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the Commission's determination not to require 
PacifiCorp to deviate from its tree-trimming guidelines in the proposed 
trimming to be done at Taylor's residence supported by substantial 
evidence. This issue is governed by the substantial evidence standard, Elks 
1 
Lodges 719 & 2021 v. Alcohol Bev. Control Comm n, 905 P.2d 1189, 1193 
(Utah 1995). This issue was not preserved for review in Taylor's petition 
for rehearing, nor does Taylor's brief contain any citation to the record 
indicating that the issue was preserved. However, Taylor's petition for 
rehearing did contain a general attack on the Commission's fact-finding, see 
record ("R.") 0048. If the Court determines to address the Commission's 
fact-finding notwithstanding the deficiencies in Taylor's preservation of the 
issue, it should do so by undertaking a substantial evidence review. 
2. Did the Commission otherwise act in accordance with law in 
reaching the determination not to require PacifiCorp to deviate from its 
tree-trimming guidelines in the proposed trimming to be done at 
Taylor's residence. This issue is governed by the correction of error 
standard, Anderson v. Pub. Serv. Comm % 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 1992). 
This issue was not preserved for review in Taylor's petition for rehearing, 
nor does Taylor's brief contain any citation to the record indicating that the 
issue was preserved. However, Taylor's petition for rehearing did raise the 
issue of whether the Commission erred in refusing to consider real property 
arguments concerning the absence of an express easement on Taylor's 
property, see R. 0048. If the Court determines to address the Commission's 
application of the law notwithstanding the deficiencies in Taylor's 
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preservation of the issue, it should do so by undertaking a correction-of-error 
review. 
CITATION TO AUTHORITIES 
Statutes, Commission rules, and tariff provisions that are or may be 
determinative or of central importance to this appeal are as follows, and are 
reproduced in Addendum 1 to this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-8; 54-4-1; 54-7-9; 54-7-15; 63-46b-16 
Utah Admin. Code R746-310-4.D 
Utah Power & Light Co., Utah Electric Service Regulation No. 6 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is to review a Commission final report and order denying 
the relief sought in a consumer complaint proceeding brought by Taylor, a 
PacifiCorp residential customer. Taylor filed a formal complaint against 
PacifiCorp on April 8, 2003, seeking to a) minimize certain tree trimming 
PacifiCorp sought to accomplish on his property; b) reduce PacifiCorp's 
clearance distances between power lines and trees and provide more 
frequent trimming by PacifiCorp; or c) if neither of the above were possible, 
to have PacifiCorp accept liability for aesthetic damage caused by the 
trimming PacifiCorp sought to accomplish, see R. 0003. PacifiCorp filed a 
motion to dismiss Taylor's complaint on April 23, 2003, seeking an 
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expedited resolution because it viewed the trimming to be accomplished at 
Taylor's property as urgent, to prevent possible service or safety issues 
caused by tree contact with a power line crossing Taylor's property. A 
hearing was held before the Commission's Administrative Law Judge on 
May 29, 2003, and the Commission issued a report and order on June 17, 
2003, denying Taylor's requested relief. Taylor petitioned the Commission 
for rehearing and for a stay of the June 17 order on July 7, 2003. The 
petition was not granted. Taylor then filed a petition for review of the 
Commission's order at the Utah Supreme Court, on August 28, 2003. On 
appeal, the Commission, Taylor, and PacifiCorp stipulated to a stay of the 
appeal and a limited remand in order for the Commission to clearly 
designate the proceeding as a formal adjudicative proceeding under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. At the same time, the Commission and 
Taylor stipulated to a stay of the Commission's order so that the trimming 
would not be completed pending appellate review. The Supreme Court 
granted the stay and limited remand of the appeal on September 23, 2003. 
On September 30, 2003, the Commission issued a procedural order 
clarifying that the matter was a formal adjudicative proceeding and a report 
and order ("Order") on limited remand denying Taylor's requested relief, but 
granting a stay of the proposed trimming pending appeal. Thereafter, the 
appeal resumed and was transferred by the Supreme Court to this Court. 
The relevant facts underlying this dispute are relatively 
straightforward. PacifiCorp's tariff includes a provision that customers must 
"permit [PacifiCorp] to trim trees and other vegetation to the extent 
necessary to avoid interference with [PacifiCorp9s] lines and to protect 
public safety." R. 0007; see also Addendum 1 (Electric Service Regulation 
No. 6(2)(c)). To implement this requirement, as well as the requirement in 
Utah Administrative Code R746-310-4.D establishing the National 
Electrical Safety Code standards as "the minimum requirements" PacifiCorp 
is required to follow in its line maintenance {see Addendum 1, R746-310-
4.D), PacifiCorp established certain standard clearance guidelines for 
maintaining a safe distance between vegetation and power lines. R. 0006 at 
5. Those clearance guidelines vary by the rate of growth anticipated for the 
tree-type at issue, and are publicly available on PacifiCorp's website. R. 
0006 at 5; R. 0008; R. 0074 at 20-21 (relevant portions of R. 0074, the 
transcript of the Commission hearing in the matter below, are attached 
hereto as Addendum 2). 
In early 2003, PacifiCorp sought to trim certain trees at Taylor's 
property. PacifiCorp began to trim but Taylor objected to the extent of the 
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trimming. R. 0006 at 2. Various conversations between Taylor and 
PacifiCorp ensued. Eventually Taylor filed a formal complaint with the 
Commission seeking to reduce the clearance distances PacifiCorp sought to 
accomplish with its trimming. PacifiCorp's testimony, which Taylor does 
not dispute, is that the proposed trimming was consistent with PacifiCorp's 
guidelines. Addendum 2 (R. 0074 at 73). There was no testimony that 
Taylor was subject to any discrimination by PacifiCorp. Therefore, although 
other facts also emerged—including facts demonstrating PacifiCorp's 
willingness to implement an alternative solution such as burying the line at 
issue if Taylor paid for that solution in accordance with PacifiCorp's 
approved tariff (see Addendum 2, R. 0074 at 80)—the fundamental fact at 
issue became the reasonableness of PacifiCorp's guidelines themselves. 
Assuming arguendo that Taylor has adequately preserved any relevant issue 
for appeal, the question of whether there was substantial evidence for the 
Commission's determination that Taylor failed to demonstrate the 
inappropriateness of the PacifiCorp's proposed clearance distances is now 
the key issue on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. TAYLOR HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE AND 
ADEQUATELY PRESENT HIS ARGUMENTS. Through a failure to 
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follow rules of appellate procedure, failure to preserve issues for appeal by 
raising them in a petition for rehearing before the Commission, and failure to 
appropriately marshal the evidence, Taylor has failed to preserve and 
appropriately present his arguments for appellate review. He has not, 
therefore, met his burden to show that he was substantially prejudiced by the 
Commission's order, and that the order was unconstitutional, erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law, was not supported by substantial evidence, or 
was otherwise arbitrary or capricious. See Beehive Telephone Co. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm n of Utah, 2004 UT 18, % 17, 89 P.3d 131, 138 (citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16); Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^ 23, 48 
P.3d 918, 927, n. 9 ("We decline to address this claim because it has not 
been properly briefed. A single, vague sentence without citation to the 
record or legal authority is inadequate.") (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 450 (Utah 1988) (noting that appellate courts are not a "'depository in 
which a party may drop the burden of argument and research.5") (quoting 
Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981))). In the 
absence of Taylor meeting this burden, there is no basis to sustain Taylor's 
appeal. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION WAS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND WAS OTHERWISE 
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IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. Even if the Court determines to look 
beyond the deficiencies in Taylor's briefing and review the sufficiency of 
the Commission's underlying order, Taylor has not met his burden to show 
that the order was unconstitutional, that it erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law, that it was not supported by substantial evidence, or that it was 
otherwise arbitrary or capricious. Rather, the order was supported by 
substantial evidence and was otherwise in accordance with law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TAYLOR HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE AND ADEQUATELY 
PRESENT HIS ARGUMENTS. 
As the appellant, Taylor bears the burden to marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the Commission's order, and show that "despite the 
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." See Johnson-Bowles 
Co., Inc. v. Division of Securities ofDept. of Commerce of State of Utah, 
829 P.2d 101, 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quotation omitted). In 
accomplishing this, Taylor is required to follow rules of appellate procedure 
as well as statutory requirements regarding the preservation of issues for 
appeal. See, e.g., Beehive Telephone Company, 2004 UT 18, ffij 6-7; Utah 
Associated Municipal Power Systems vs. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, 298 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1990). Taylor has failed to follow 
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appropriate appellate procedure, failed to preserve issues for appeal, and 
failed to marshal the evidence. 
A. Failure To comply With Appellate Briefing Requirements 
And To Preserve Issues For Appeal. 
Taylor fails to comply with a number of the rules of appellate 
procedure. Because of this, Taylor's arguments are precluded from 
appellate consideration and should be disregarded by the Court. Recently, 
the Utah Supreme Court noted its concern for this type of failure and the 
possible consequences. 
[W]e find ourselves compelled to address the necessity of 
complying with our appellate briefing requirements. 
"Our rules of appellate procedure clearly set forth the 
requirements that appellants and appellees must meet 
when submitting briefs before this court. See Utah R. 
App. P. 24. The rules are easy to understand and offer a 
step-by-step approach to writing an appellate brief." . . . 
Compliance is mandatory, and failure to conform to these 
requirements may carry serious consequences. For 
example, "[b]riefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the 
court." Utah. R. App. P. 24(j). 
Beehive Telephone Company, 2004 UT 18, f 12 (quoting MacKay vs. 
Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Utah 1998)). 
Taylor did not preserve his issues for appeal and has failed to show 
that they were preserved for appeal. Taylor is required to provide "citation 
to the record showing that the issue was preserved." See Utah R. App. P. 
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24(a)(5)(A). This is particularly important in an appeal of a matter decided 
by the Commission because an applicant may not urge or rely on any ground 
not set forth in the application [for rehearing before the Commission] in an 
appeal to any court." Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b). An issue is not 
preserved for appeal unless it has been specifically raised in a petition for 
rehearing before the Commission. Utah Associated Municipal Power 
Systems, 298 P.2d 298 at 300.l Any issue Taylor wishes to raise in this 
Court must have been specifically identified in his Petition for Rehearing 
filed with the Commission in July of 2003 (found at R. 0048, Petition for 
Rehearing, pages 1-9). 
Contrary to Appellate Rule 24(a)(5) requirements, nowhere in 
Taylor's brief has he cited where any of the six issues he raises in his 
appellate brief were preserved for appeal. A comparison of Taylor's 
Appellate Briefs six issues (Brief of Petitioner, pages 1-2) and his 
arguments (Brief of Petitioner, pages 6-13) with his Petition for Rehearing 
before the Commission (R. 0048) shows that what Taylor attempts to raise 
before this Court is precluded by Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b). It 
1
 This statutory provision also precludes Taylor from attempting to 
raise an issue not preserved through inclusion in his Commission rehearing 
request through Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(5)(B) or any 
other means. Utah Associated Mun. Power v. PSC, supra, at 300, n.l. 
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appears that Taylor's appellate briefing efforts are trying to address Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) points, alone, rather than the requirement of Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b). The closest Taylor comes to meeting his need 
to establish preservation of an issue is his appellate Issue 4 and argument 
(that the Commission "erred by ignoring property law concerning 
easements." Brief of Petitioner, at page 12) and his Commission Petition for 
Rehearing point two ("Complainant does not argue that the Commission is a 
court of law which may determine the existence or extent of property 
rights." R. 0048 at 2) and point six ("It [the Commission] may not be (sic) its 
jurisdiction to determine easement rights, but it does have the authority and 
duty to consider facts of record and law." R. 0048 at 7). But even here, 
Taylor still fails to recognize that the Commission does not have any 
authority to rule upon the existence or extent of any easement which 
PacifiCorp may or may not have on Taylor's real property. See, Basin 
Flying Service v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 
(Utah 1975). 
Whatever the Commission's views on the nature of PacifiCorp's 
property interests in Taylor's real property, the Commission has authority to 
address only the terms and conditions of PacifiCorp's service—in this 
instance, the reasonableness of PacifiCorp's maintenance of its electric 
11 
utility plant and the application of PacifiCorp's tariff regulations concerning 
the trimming of vegetation which may interfere with its utility plant and 
operations. In considering Taylor's complaint against PacifiCorp below, the 
Commission did not have authority to resolve the dispute on the basis of a 
ruling on the real property interests the parties may or may not have. Cf., 
Kearns-Tribune Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 682 P.2d 858 
(Utah 1984) (Commission action and rule set aside where there is no explicit 
statutory authority upon which the rule was based). 
B. Failure To Marshal Evidence In Support Of The Order. 
Appellate Rule 27(a)(7) requires Taylor to marshal record evidence 
supporting the Commission's order. Taylor challenges the Commission's 
determination without making any effective effort to marshal the record 
evidence supporting the Order or showing that the record evidence does not 
support the ultimate ruling made in the Order. Because of Taylor's failure to 
comply with this appellate requirement, his challenge fails. The Court "must 
assume that the evidence supported the [Commission's] findings." Utah 
Medical Products v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998); see also, Hogle 
v. Zinetics Medical, Incorporated, 63 P.3d 80, 85 (Utah 2002) ("To mount a 
successful challenge . . . the appellant must first marshal all the evidence 
supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
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insufficient to support the findings even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below." Internal quotation and citations and omitted); 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Company, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (Appellant must become the devil's advocate and 
marshal every scrape of competent evidence in support and then point out 
the fatal flaw in the evidence.). 
Taylor's Appellate Brief reads as if he is seeking to retry his case 
below. Taylor seemingly asks this Court to become a trier of fact, consider 
and weigh evidence and grant relief by ordering PacifiCorp to engage or not 
engage Taylor-specified activities and award Taylor damages. See, e.g., 
Appellate Brief at 13. By so doing, Taylor asks this Court to commit error 
by substituting itself in the role of the Commission and substituting its 
judgment for the Commission's; to exercise legislative authority given to the 
Commission and not Utah courts. Cf., Utah Department of Business 
Regulation v. Public Service Commission, 614 P.2d 1242, 1250 (Utah 1980) 
("The review by this [Utah Supreme] Court of the orders of the PSC is 
confined to the legal issues . . . . Any interference by this Court beyond the 
aforementioned limits would constitute an interference with the lawmaking 
power of this state."); Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 615 ("[T]he public authority empowered 
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to regulate and 'supervise all of the business9 of a public utility, U.C.A. § 
54-4-1, is the Commission, not this Court/'); Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph v. Public Service Commission, 155 P.2d 184, 188 (Utah 
1945) (The court, refusing to substitute its judgment for that of the 
Commission, noted "that is not our function. Indeed, it is not a judicial 
function. It is legislative and is to be exercised by the arm of the legislature, 
the Public Service Commission."). 
As before the Commission below, Taylor apparently recognizes no 
procedural end to his effort to present additional evidence. For example, 
Taylor asks this Court to consider an alleged, inappropriate elevator 
conversation involving the Administrative Law Judge, when Taylor never 
made the Commission aware of such an issue. This error is similar to 
Taylor's erroneous effort to present new, additional evidence after the 
parties had the opportunity to present their evidence at the hearing held May 
29, 2003, the Commission closed the record and issued its June 17, 2003 
order. With his Petition for Rehearing filed with the Commission July 7, 
2003, Taylor asked the Commission to consider additional evidence 
(material and statements which Taylor views as supporting his contentions 
of an appropriate trimming practice and distance) he had not introduced at 
the hearing. See R.0050, Exhibit B: Correspondence from Salt Lake City 
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Urban Forestry Division to Bryan Taylor, attached to Petition for Rehearing. 
He did so without explanation of why this new evidence or similar evidence 
was not available at the time of the May 29, 2003 hearing or why he did not 
or could not have introduced the material at the hearing. Taylor also failed 
to provide a supportable basis to permit use of the hearsay evidence that he 
included in his post-hearing material in contravention of Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-10(3) ("A finding of fact that is contested may not be based solely on 
hearsay unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence."). Taylor continues to rely upon this post-hearing material in his 
argument before this Court without explanation of how it can be 
appropriately viewed as received record evidence and used in consideration 
of any argument. Apparently, in Taylor's view, the record never closes— 
indeed, significant portions Taylor's Appellate Brief appear to have no basis 
(and certainly none is cited) in the existing record. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION WAS SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND WAS OTHERWISE IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. 
A. The Order Was Supported By Substantial Evidence. 
The action below was a consumer complaint proceeding. As 
complainant, Taylor was required to "specify the act committed or omitted 
by the public utility that is claimed to be in violation of the law or a rule or 
15 
order of the commission." Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-9(2). As complainant, 
Taylor also then bore the burden of persuasion to demonstrate PacifiCorp's 
violation of law, or Commission rule or order. See, e.g., Peoples Finance & 
Thrift Co. v. Landes, 503 P.2d 444,446 (Utah 1972) (burden of proof and of 
ultimate persuasion of all of the essentials of cause of action were on 
plaintiff); In re Portland General Elec. Co., UM 989, Order No. 01-152, 
2001 WL 306733, *1 (Or. PUC Feb. 2, 2001) (Under the customer 
complaint statute, "the moving party, the complainant, has the burden of 
persuasion."). Taylor argues that the Commission erred in requiring Taylor 
to meet this burden of persuasion (see Appellate Brief, Issue 1), but cites no 
authority for that proposition. Instead he cites cases demonstrating the non-
controversial proposition that Taylor was entitled to a fair hearing. Id. at 6. 
On appeal, Taylor again bears the burden to demonstrate that the 
Commission's factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court. See, e.g., Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App.1989). 
Substantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence, but 
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Id. at 68. It is "such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
16 
conclusion." Id. (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 
257, 715 P.2d 927,930 (1985)). 
In its briefing before the Commission and at the hearing, PacifiCorp 
submitted competent evidence that its tree-trimming clearance distances 
were consistent with those of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Addendum 2 (R. 
0074 at 8-10, 13-17); R. 0006 at 5, n. 10 (citing Mathews v. Georgia Power 
Co., 333 SE2d 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (utility had responsibility to 
maintain a 15-foot clearance between trees and power line); Motto v. West 
Penn Power Co., 1995 WL 945202, *8 (Pa. PUC Dec. 8, 1995) (minimum 
of 8 feet clearance from any conductor); Re Connecticut Light and Power 
Co., 92 P.U.R.4th 50 (Conn. DPUC Mar. 23, 1988) (approving tree 
trimming program with clearance requirements of 8 feet along side, 10 feet 
below and 15 feet above all primary conductors)). It submitted competent 
evidence that its clearance distances were consistent with industry best-
practices. Addendum 2 (R. 0074 at 13-17). It submitted competent 
evidence that its clearance distances were necessary to protect the public 
safety and service reliability, based on an appropriate trimming cycle and 
taking into account factors such as wind, snow accumulation, and sagging 
power lines. Id. (R. 0074 at 23, 49). It submitted competent evidence that 
its tree-trimming guidelines were publicly available on its web site and that 
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they were provided to customers such as Taylor, as a door hanger, when 
trimming was to be performed. Id. (R. 0074 at 28-29). Finally, PacifiCorp 
submitted competent evidence that its clearance distances were consistent 
with the National Electrical Safety Code, as required by Commission rule. 
See id. (R. 0074 at 12-13). 
In response, Taylor questioned the objectivity of PacifiCorp's 
evidence, but provided no actual evidence undermining the objectivity of the 
sources cited by PacifiCorp. Id. (R. 0074 at 37-40). Taylor also submitted 
evidence from an arboricultural society that "topping" a tree is not an 
appropriate trimming practice. Id. (R. 0074 at 54). PacifiCorp agreed with 
that view and submitted evidence that it had no intention of "topping" 
Taylor's trees since this was not an accepted PacifiCorp practice. Id. (R. 
0074at77). 
Taylor's principal arguments in the hearing were focused on the 
alleged need for easements and on the precedential effect of PacifiCorp's 
past trimming practices. But Taylor's presentation did not provide a 
reasonable basis for rejecting PacifiCorp's clearance distances, in light of 
industry practices and the uncontroverted evidence that the clearance 
distances are consistent with the National Electrical Safety Code as required 
by Commission rule. In short, Taylor provided no substantial evidence that 
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PacifiCorp's proposed trimming would violate any law, Commission rule or 
Commission order, or that its clearance distances were unreasonable, and 
certainly did not provide sufficient evidence to now demonstrate that the 
Commission's Order was not based on substantial evidence. In such 
circumstances, the Commission did not err in rejecting Taylor's request to 
order PacifiCorp to deviate from its trimming guidelines. 
B. The Order Was In Accordance With Law. 
Taylor's arguments that the Commission committed legal error have 
largely focused on the Commission's determination not to consider evidence 
on the existence, or lack thereof, of a PacifiCorp easement at Taylor's 
property. As noted above, this argument fails to recognize that the 
Commission does not have any authority to rule upon the existence or extent 
of any easement which PacifiCorp may or may not have on Taylor's real 
property. See, Basin Flying Service v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 
531 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 1975). Whatever the Commission's views on 
the nature of PacifiCorp's property interests in Taylor's real property, the 
Commission has authority to address only the terms and conditions of 
2
 The Appellate Brief also makes new, vague allusions to 
constitutional due process and property rights. As these arguments may 
relate to the burden of proof they are addressed above. As the arguments 
relate to due process and fairness, the record in its entirety shows that Taylor 
received a full and fair hearing of his complaint. See, e.g., generally R. 
0074. 
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PacifiCorp's service—in this instance, the alleged unreasonableness of 
PacifiCorp's maintenance of its electric utility plant and the application of 
PacifiCorp's tariff regulations concerning the trimming of vegetation which 
may interfere with its utility plant and operations. In considering Taylor's 
complaint against PacifiCorp below, therefore, the Commission did not have 
authority to resolve the dispute on the basis of a ruling on the real property 
interests the parties may or may not have. Cf., Kearns-Tribune Corporation 
v. Public Service Commission, 682 P.2d 858 (Utah 1984) (Commission 
action and rule set aside where there is no explicit statutory authority upon 
which the rule was based). 
While the Commission could not consider property rights that concern 
issues beyond the scope of its jurisdiction, it could consider PacifiCorp's 
tariff. That tariff has the force of law, and allows PacifiCorp to trim 
Taylor's trees to the extent necessary to protect public safety and reliable 
service. See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 
681 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1984) ("Courts have consistently held that tariffs 
have the force of law."); Addendum 1 (Electrical Service Regulation 6). 
Moreover, if easements were required and the Commission were bound to 
consider them—as PacifiCorp pointed out in the hearing, the very tariff 
section providing for Taylor's obligation to allow trimming to the extent 
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necessary to protect the public safety and service reliability, also provides 
that, if necessary, a customer shall - without cost to PacifiCorp - convey any 
easements across the property necessary or incidental to PacifiCorp's 
furnishing of service to the customer. Addendum 2 (R. 0074 at 85-86); 
Addendum 1 (Electric Service Regulation 6). 
The determination of whether PacifiCorp was violating any law, rule 
or order subject to the Commission's jurisdiction reflected the end of the 
Commission's legislative authority to make a determination in this matter. 
The Commission did not commit error in failing to account for arguments 
about easements that were outside the scope of its jurisdiction, nor has 
Taylor demonstrated that the Commission's order unconstitutional, arbitrary 
or capricious, or in any way contrary to law. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Taylor has not followed required procedure, has not appropriately 
preserved his arguments, and has not marshaled the evidence. Even if he 
had done these things, the Commission's Order was supported by substantial 
evidence, did not violate Taylor's constitutional rights, was not arbitrary or 
capricious, and was otherwise in accordance with law. For these reasons, 
the Commission's Order should be affirmed and Taylor's petition for review 
dismissed. 
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rd RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23ra day of June 2004. 
Sandy Mooy ' 
Attorney for Public Service 
Commission 
Gregory B. Monson 
David L. Elmont 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Attorneys for PacifiCorp 
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copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS to be mailed, postage 
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Bryan Taylor 
2504 Beacon Dr. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Sander J. Mooy 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
160 E. 300 S. 4th Floor 
P.O. Box 45585 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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54-3-8. Preferences forbidden — Power of commission to determine facts. 
(1) No public utility shall, as to rates, charges, service, facilities or in any other 
respect, make or grant any preference or advantage to any person, or subject any person 
to any prejudice or disadvantage. No public utility shall establish or maintain any 
unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, service or facilities, or in any other respect, 
either as between localities or as between classes of service. 
(2) The commission shall have power to determine any question of fact arising under 
this section. 
54-4-1. General jurisdiction. 
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and 
regulate every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such 
public utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or 
in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction; provided, however, that the Department of Transportation shall have 
jurisdiction over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of 
Transportation Act. 
54-7-9. Complaints against utilities — Scope. 
(1) When any public utility violates any provision of law or any order or rule of the 
commission: 
(a) the commission may file a notice of agency action; or 
(b) any person, corporation, chamber of commerce, board of trade, or any civic, 
commercial, mercantile, traffic, agricultural, or manufacturing organization or 
association, or any body politic or municipal corporation may file a request for agency 
action. 
(2) The notice or request shall specify the act committed or omitted by the public 
utility that is claimed to be in violation of the law or a rule or order of the commission. 
(3) No request for agency action shall be entertained by the commission concerning 
the reasonableness of any rates or charges of any gas, electrical, water, sewerage, or 
telephone corporation, unless the request is signed by: 
(a) the mayor, the president or chairman of the board of trustees, or the 
commissioners, or a majority of the council, commission, or other legislative body of the 
city, county, or town within which the alleged violation occurred; or 
(b) by not less than 25 consumers or purchasers, or prospective consumers or 
purchasers, of the gas, electricity, water, sewerage, or telephone service. 
(4) The commission need not dismiss any complaint because of the absence of direct 
damage to the complainant. 
54-7-15. Review or rehearing by commission — Application — Procedure — 
Prerequisite to court action — Effect of commission decisions. 
(1) Before seeking judicial review of the commission's action, any party, stockholder, 
bondholder, or other person pecuniarily interested in the public utility who is dissatisfied 
with an order of the commission shall meet the requirements of this section. 
(2) (a) After any order or decision has been made by the commission, any party to the 
action or proceeding, any stockholder, bondholder, or other party pecuniarily interested in 
the public utility affected may apply for rehearing of any matters determined in the action 
or proceeding. 
(b) An applicant may not urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the application in 
an appeal to any court. 
(c) Any application for rehearing not granted by the commission within 20 days is 
denied. 
(d) (i) If the commission grants any application for rehearing without suspending the 
order involved, the commission shall issue its decision on rehearing within 20 days after 
final submission. 
(ii) If the commission fails to render its decision on rehearing within 20 days, the 
order involved is affirmed. 
(e) Unless an order of the commission directs that an order is stayed or postponed, an 
application for review or rehearing does not excuse any corporation or person from 
complying with and obeying any order or decision of the commission. 
(3) Any order or decision on rehearing that abrogates, changes, or modifies an original 
order or decision has the same force and effect as an original order or decision, but does 
not affect any right, or the enforcement of any right, arising from the original order or 
decision unless so ordered by the commission. 
(4) An order of the commission, including a decision on rehearing: 
(a) shall have binding force and effect only with respect to a public utility that is an 
actual party to the proceeding in which the order is rendered; and 
(b) does not determine any right, privilege, obligation, duty, constraint, burden, or 
responsibility with respect to a public utility that is not a party to the proceeding in which 
the order is rendered unless, in accordance with Subsection 63-46a-3(6), the commission 
makes a rule that incorporates the one or more principles of law that: 
(i) are established by the order; 
(ii) are not in commission rules at the time of the order; and 
(iii) affect the right, privilege, obligation, duty, constraint, burden, or responsibility 
with respect to the public utility. 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action 
with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the 
appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional 
filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the 
record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agencyfs record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any 
of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or 
has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Admin. Code R746-310-4 
D. General Requirements - Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, the 
requirements contained in the National Electrical Safety Code, as defined at R746-310-
1(B)(13), constitute the minimum requirements relative to the following: 
1. the installation and maintenance of electrical supply stations; 
2. the installation and maintenance of overhead and underground electrical supply and 
communication lines; 
3. the installation and maintenance of electric utilization equipment; 
4. rules to be observed in the operation of electrical equipment and lines; 
5. the grounding of electrical circuits. 
P.S.CU. No. 44 Original Sheet No. 6R.1 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
ELECTRIC SERVICE REGULATION NO. 6 
STATE OF UTAH 
Company's Installation 
1. COMPANY'S INSTALLATION 
Except as otherwise provided in these Regulations, an Electric Service Agreement, or the Electric 
Service Schedules, the Company will install and maintain its lines and equipment on its side of the 
Point of Delivery, but shall not be required to install or maintain any lines or equipment except meters 
and accessories beyond that point Only the Company is authorized to make the connections at the 
Point of Delivery. Electric service furnished under this tariff will be alternating current, 60 hertz, 
single or three-phase, at one of the nominal standard voltages available from the Company at or near 
the Customer's location. 
2. COMPANY FACILITIES ON CUSTOMER'S PREMISES 
(a) All materials furnished and installed by the Company on the Customer's premises, shall be, 
and remain, the property of the Company. The Customer shall not break the Company's 
seals. In the event of loss or damage to the Company's property, arising from neglect, 
carelessness, or misuse by the Customer, the cost of necessary repairs or replacement shall 
be paid by the Customer. 
(b) Customer without expense to the Company shall make or procure conveyance to the 
Company of satisfactory Rights-of-Way Easements across the property owned or controlled 
by the Customer for the Company's lines or extensions thereof necessary or incidental to the 
/^~\ furnishing of service to the Customer. 
\ 
( (c) The Customer shall permit access by the Company's representatives at all hours to maintain 
/ electric distribution facilities on the Customer's premises. The Customer shall permit the 
• ^ ^ Company to trim trees and other vegetation to the extent necessary to avoid interference 
with the Company's lines and to protect public safety. 
(d) The Customer shall give the Company the right to enter the Customer's premises, at 
reasonable times, for the purpose of reading meters, inspecting, repairing or removing 
metering devices and wiring of the Company. 
Issued by authority of Report and Order of the Public Service Commission of Utah in Docket No. 01-035-01 
Advice No. 01-10 
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Q (BY MR. ELMONT:) Good morning, Mr. Miller. 
You've already been sworn in. Would you state your 
place of employment and your position there? 
A I'm Assistant Forester with PacifiCorp. 
Q And what's your business address? 
A I'm at 230 North Temple office which is 1407 
West North Temple here in Salt Lake, zip code 84116. 
Q Can you give us your educational and 
professional background? 
A I have a bachelor's degree in horticulture 
and a master's degree in urban forestry. That's my 
educational background. I first became involved in 
horticulture and arboriculture when I was a teenager 
in 1976 and I have been working in the field ever 
since. I have held positions in private industry for| 
nursery arboriculture firm landscaping contractors. 
I have worked in -- for a golf course, a country club| 
in Chicago which is a great job. 
I also worked for two years in Utah as a 
state community forester. I had a great job in the 
state educating people about trees and urban 
community forestry throughout the state. In fact 
that's where I got interested in utility 
DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES, INC. (SOI) 3^S - 11 81 B 
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1 J circumstances of the pruning that needs to be 
2 I accomplished on Mr. Taylor's property? 
3 A Yes, it does because it ties to the 
4 International Safety Code. 
5 Q And what subsection within Section D would j 
6 ( specifically apply in the case of trimming around the, 
7 primary conductor? 
8 J A That would be subsection two, the 
9 I installation and maintenance of overhead underground 
10 supplies and the communication lines. Tree 
11 maintenance is maintenance. 
12 Q I'd like you to turn to Tab B, if you would. 
13 Can you identify that document? 
14 A This is a 1993 edition of the National 
15 I Electrical Safety Code that was referred to the 
16 Public Service Commission rules that we just 
17 J reviewed. 
18 I Q If you turn to page 2 within Tab B which is 
19 actually marked at page 67, can you read for us 
20 Section 218(A)(1)? 
21 A This is Section 218f tree trimming 
22 sub(A)(l). "Trees that may interfere with ungrounded] 
23 supply conductors should be trimmed or removed. 
24 J NOTE: Normal tree growth, the combined movement of 
25 trees and conductors under adverse weather 
DEPOMAX Rfc]?ORtlNG SERVICES, irfC . (feul) 32fe-116ti 
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1 leverage tree biology and tree health to our 
2 advantage to clear the tree and maintain tree health 
3 in the context of providing a safe and reliable 
4 J electric power as we possibly can. 
5 I Q Does that mean that there are no absolute 
6 I minimum clearance distances which you cannot go for 
7 safety purposes? 
8 A No. It does not mean that at all. I mean, 
9 there are things that are dangerous, and we have an 
10 obligation to correct those. 
11 Q I'd like to turn with you, then, to sub 2 
12 within Tab E. Can you identify this page? 
13 A This was actually in a section that Rich 
14 Buelte presented, but I put the slide together. This! 
15 is a page, the picture here, of the distribution pole 
16 with a cross arm and some squares around it is a page) 
17 out of our specification manual. And what it shows 
18 is our clearance guidelines. This happens to be the 
19 guidelines that we use for moderately growing trees, 
20 fast growing trees moderately fast that we define as 
21 trees that grow between one and three feet a year. 
22 That's important because I think that some 
23 of the trees involved in the Taylor property are 
24 slower growing than this and we allow less clearance 
25 than this particular frame or slide depicts. But the| 
1
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1 I permanent thing here to the side, our clearance 
2 requirements are 10 feet and underneath 12 feet for 
3 I moderately fast growing trees. For slow growing 
4 J trees, we would reduce that to eight feet on the side] 
5 and 10 feet underneath. But these are guidelines we 
6 I set up around which we work with the tree to achieve 
7 our clearances. 
8 So if there were clearances available at 
9 nine feet, if this was a natural target at nine feet, 
10 that would be fine. If it was at 11 feet to the 
11 side, that would be fine. We allow the trained 
12 workers that we employ some discretion in this manner] 
13 so that we are looking out for the health of the 
14 tree. 
15 Q How close can a trained worker get to a line| 
16 in trimming without cutting the power for safety? 
17 A There is an industrial standard ANSI Z133 
18 that specifies an approach, minimum approach 
19 distances. For untrained workers somebody with no 
20 electrical training it is 10 feet. They cannot work 
21 within 10 feet of an energized power line. For 
22 someone who is trained, it is 2 feet 4 inches below 
23 I 5,000 feet and at 5,000 feet and above around here, 
24 it would be 2 feet 8 inches. So even somebody with 
25 an electrical training who makes their living 
DEPOMAX ftSEbkTItiG SfcRVICES, INC. (tiOl) 325-1188 
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1 Q Thank you. Turning back to Tab E-2, the topi 
2 bullet point says "Clearances are guidelines intended 
3 J to provide 3 years of clearance." Does that identify! 
4 the tree trimming cycle for the Company? 
5 A Yes, that's right. Our tree trimming cycles 
6 are -- tree work cycles for the company are between j 
7 three and four years depending on elevation or the 
8 type of trees. Here in the Salt Lake valley our 
9 clearances are designed for three years of clearance.! 
10 Q And is that consistent with the cycles in 
11 other jurisdictions to your knowledge? 
12 A Yes, they are, particularly ones in our 
13 region. 
14 Q Thank you. I'd like to turn your attention 
15 then to Tab E-3, the final bullet point part of a 
16 summary says, "Utah Power's program is professionally] 
17 managed and based on the industries best practices." 
18 Is it your testimony, Mr. Miller, that in fact the 
19 vegetation management policy of PacifiCorp is in 
20 compliance with the industry's best practices? 
21 A I do. I wrote this and I stand behind it. 
22 I'm very proud of our program, and I think that we ' re| 
23 recognized around the country for our expertise. 
24 Q Thank you. Does the Company's vegetation 
25 management policy as implemented comply with the 
bEPOMAX kfcfroktlttG afikvicES, INC. (faOl) 328-llbb 
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1 the tariff? 
2 A I think so, yes. 
3 I Q And are they consistent with the 
4 J presentation you made to the Commission in 
5 September 2000? 
6 I A Yes, they are. 
7 Q I'd like you to turn with me to Tab H. 
8 I Would you identify that document please? 
9 A This is a page from our website describing 
10 J our tree work. People can have questions about our 
11 work and access PacifiCorp's website and read about 
12 what we intend to do. And it just provides a 
13 synopsis of our work. 
14 Again, if you look about our tree trimming 
15 section it talks about fast growing trees and the 
16 clearance we require: 14 feet, medium 12 and slow 
17 J growing 10 feet. And then underneath we also see 
18 pictures of the type of shapes that we might get 
19 from, from tree work, trees that are growing 
20 associated with power lines. We don't want any 
21 secrets. We want people up front because midline 
22 many people don't like the way it looks. We want to 
23 discuss our work up front and this has been on our 
24 website for several years now. 
25 Q So it is your testimony this is publicly 
bfcpOMAX kSfrofrfiNG afckVlcES, I N C . (801) 328-1188 
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1 foliage would be taken off of them and they might be 
2 killed. Our recommendation is to remove those trees 
3 entirely. 
4 There's a locust that I believe just has to 
5 I do some light trimming, just a couple of branches 
6 light trimming. And the plum is already done. So 
7 roughly that's my understanding of the tree that we 
8 propose on the Taylor property. 
9 Q And having described that proposed work, is 
10 it your testimony that it will be consistent with the 
11 Company's vegetation management policy? 
12 A To the letter. 
13 Q Thank you. I don't have anything further at 
14 this point. 
15 A Thank you. 
16 JUDGE TINGEY: You get to ask questions now 
17 CROSS EXAMINATION 
18 Q (BY MR. TAYLOR:) My first question is you 
19 made clear that you've been in with PacifiCorp for 
20 quite sometime? 
21 I A For ten years now. 
22 I Q Okay. And so your paycheck comes from 
23 PacifiCorp, right? 
24 A That's correct. 
25 Q Okay. So given that time, I'd say you 
1
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1 JUDGE TINGEY: Okay. I thought you might. 
2 J MR. ELMONT: And just for your information 
3 in terms of the two tree removal thing, either 
4 through Mr. Taylor or if you would like us to bring 
5 J Mr. Buelte to answer that question, I believe we're 
6 talking about 20 to 30 trees total. So two of those 
7 that would need to be removed. But we can elicit 
8 that in testimony if you want me to ask the question 
9 I will, or just to sort of clean up the point that 
10 Mr. Miller is making. 
11 FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 Q (BY MR. ELMONT:) Mr. Miller, do you view 
13 the ANSI guidelines in any way in conflict with the 
14 NESC standards? 
15 A Absolutely not. 
16 Q When you talk about the ten-foot clearance 
17 requirement, does that take into account wind, snow 
18 and other types of variance that can impact how the 
19 I branches move? 
20 A Right. Lines sag and the wind blowing the 
21 wire, the wind blowing the tree. 
22 Q And finally, could you explain why it is 
23 that removal of all or nearly all of the foliage on 
24 the couple of gamble oaks that are the issue, why 
25 that would possibly or likely kill the tree? 
DfePOMAX kE^OktlNG SERVICES, INC. (SOI) 325-1188 
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1 And I don't have, you know, the three-ring 
2 binders to pass out, but I will show you this and sayj 
3 there are different views on tree trimming --
4 JUDGE TINGEY: How many copies? 
5 MR. TAYLOR: You know, just that. You 
6 know, but it has been around. You can just see the 
7 big no sign, says no topping. You know, so that's 
8 something one arborist society is clearly indicating 
9 they don't think that's necessarily appropriate tree 
10 trimming practices. 
11 You know, and in this case, you know, I'm 
12 not legal trained or anything like that, but this is 
13 an issue that's important to me. I'm a principled 
14 person and I think that citizens should as much as 
15 they can stand up for their rights. And the fact of 
16 the matter is that they have this policy of appeal 
17 and notification to the customer which really is no 
18 appeal. It's really just sending out one more person] 
19 totally 100 percent vested in the power company 
20 I telling you that we are going to do this and it is 
21 our right and you have no say in it. And the fact ofl 
22 the matter is and, you know, that the public at large] 
23 generally doesn't have either the will, the where 
24 with all, whatever, to necessarily refute that when 
25 people who present themselves as a person in 
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1 Company's position on topping generally? 
2 I A I'll address topping first. I think in my 
3 I earlier testimony, I talked about a desire to avoid 
4 topping wherever possible, but topping is a damaging 
5 I practice. I'm not familiar with the Colorado tree 
6 coalition or that group but that is excellent 
7 literature there. 
8 But topping is defined at reducing the 
9 height of a tree to a predetermined clearance limit 
10 and making arbitrary cuts on the trunk of the tree. 
11 That's a definition in the ANSI 300. I think we made| 
12 it very, very clear that predetermined clearance 
13 limits are outside of our specifications and we have 
14 guidelines and we look to natural targets. 
15 Now as far as the plum is concerned, it's 
16 not topped. I mean, if you can take a look at the 
17 picture -- of the picture of the topped tree from the| 
18 Colorado tree coalition that Mr. Taylor just talked 
19 about, and that's an organization, there's no 
20 foliage. There's just large branches with big 
21 heading cuts made. All the foliage is removed. It's! 
22 inappropriate. When we saw the pictures of the plum 
23 tree, there were still branches coming up and 
24 foliage. We made thinning cuts. We made what are 
25 called crown reduction cuts down to laterals, which 
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